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Abstract 
 
The CFA Franc – which stands for Communauté Financiaire Africaine –  refers to the West 
African CFA franc and the Central African CFA franc, two currencies that, although separate, 
are in practice interchangeable and have a fixed exchange rate to the euro. The CFA franc is 
used in 14 countries, 12 of which are former French colonies. The currency has been 
criticized for its impact on the economic sovereignty of these countries, making economic 
planning all but impossible since the CFA's value is pegged to the euro – whose monetary 
policy is set by the European Central Bank – thereby outsourcing their monetary policy. By 
using the CFA franc as a case study, and with the help of Acemoglu and Robinson’s theory of 
institutions, the present study seeks to analyze how power relations between countries affect 
the construction of trans-national economic institutions. I argue that the CFA franc acts as an 
extractive economic and monetary institution, leading to rent seeking behaviors antithetical to 
economic growth. I conclude that the former serves as a neocolonial domination tool, used by 
France to maintain its influence over its former colonies. 
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1.Introduction 
 
1.1 Research question and purpose 
 
The purpose of the present study is to analyze how power relations between former colonial 
powers and their colonies affect the construction of transnational economic institutions, using 
the CFA franc as an example. The latter was founded during a colonial era, namely the French 
ruling over Central and Western Africa. Using Acemoglu and Robison’s (A&R for the rest of 
this study) theory of institutions, I intend to show how an extractive political system – 
colonization – has led to an extractive economic and monetary system, which has survived the 
decolonization process which started in the 1950s. Furthermore, it follows that due to the 
survival of this system – which, with very few exceptions, has not changed since its creation –
, strong extractive ties between France and its former colonies remain, which would lead 
some to qualify this relation as a neocolonial one.  My research question is thus: 
 
 
What are the effects of power relations between states on the construction of 
transnational economic institution? 
 
The question will be addressed using A&R’s theory of institutions, using the CFA franc as 
a case. Answering this research question will ultimately lead to the conclusion that power 
relations between France and its former colonies continue under the guise of neocolonialism 
which, – through new mechanisms and processes – is similar in essence (if not in magnitude) 
to colonialism and similarly jeopardizes economic development and national sovereignty.  
Following a deductive logic, and using A&R as a starting point, I intend to show how an 
extractive political institution led to the creation of an extractive economic and monetary 
institution, which, by its continued existence, could indicate two things: that political 
institutions internal to the CFA zone are still extractive, and that France continues to act as an 
extractive institution – both political and economic – which helps maintaining the system. The 
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logic is indeed deductive, for it starts from a theory, leading to a hypothesis which is then 
subjected to empirical scrutiny (Byman, 2012, p.24). 
 
 
1.2 History of the CFA Franc 
 
The CFA franc was initially created in 1939, just before the second world war, but only really 
came into existence on the 26th of December 1945, in the wake of the Bretton Woods 
conference. Following France’s ratification of the Bretton Woods agreements and the 
subsequent devaluation and pegging of the French franc to the US dollar, France decided to 
create new currencies in its overseas territories in order to cushion the latter from a strong 
devaluation of the franc. The objective was to facilitate exports from the colonies to France, 
while at the same time restoring France’s monetary authority over these territories, which had 
been isolated from the metropole during the conflict (Nubukpo et al, 2016, p.86). Indeed, 
French colonies suffered from a rarefaction of trade during WWII, and sometimes had to rely 
on “improvised” local currencies pegged on currencies other than the French franc such as the 
US dollar.  
In 1958, the CFA franc then became the ‘Franc of the French Community of Africa’ 
(FCFA), after Général de Gaulle introduced the notion of ‘community’ to the colonies of 
West and Central Africa. At the time, Guinea, under Sékou Touré, was the only one to reject 
the offer and the country obtained independence in October 1958, some two years before the 
other colonies. In 1960, Guinea left the franc zone, and set up its own currency and central 
bank. The new French franc of December 1958 had a fixed parity of one French franc (FF) for 
50 FCFA (Ibid, p.89). This parity would not change for the next 36 years, until the 
devaluation of the CFA franc was imposed by France, on 12th January 1994. In the second 
half of the 1980s, a sharp fall in cocoa, coffee, cotton and oil prices on international markets 
battered the CFA-zone economies. Simultaneously, the appreciation of the French franc 
against other major currencies made the zone’s exports less competitive (Ibid, p.85). This 
double whammy, combined with rising wages and payment arrears, resulted in falling 
investment and capital flight. The devaluation of 1994 proved to be a real shock for the 
economies of the zone. The currency lost half its value in one night as one French franc, 
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previously worth 50 FCFA, became worth 100 FCFA (Ibid, p.100). As of 2015, the currency 
is used by 150 million people across 14 countries.1 
 
 
1.3 Methods 
 
The present study consists in a disciplined-configurative – or interpretative – single case 
study, since it uses an established theory to explain a case (George & Bennett 2005, p.213). 
The case study is explanatory, as it intends to explain how, using A&R’s analysis of 
institutions, an extractive – international, or exogenous – political institution led to an 
extractive economic institution, and why this state of affairs is maintained over time. 
Qualitative methods will be used for the purpose of the present study. I will rely on secondary 
data from various governmental bodies and public agencies, including the French treasury, the 
Bank of France, and the BCEAO and BEAC, which are the central banks of the Western and 
Central CFA zones respectively. These data – which constitute for the most part official 
statistics and statements – will be used in the analysis to provide evidence for the theory. GDP 
growth values, human development indicators, data pertaining to access to financial markets 
as well as estimations of foreign exchange reserves will be used from the aforementioned 
sources. The reason for their use in the present study is their high-quality and reliability 
(Bryman 2012, p.312). In addition, I conducted one semi-structured interview with Kako 
Nubukpo, the current director of the Digital and Economic Francophonie section of the 
International Organisation of La Francophonie (IOF), which took place in his office in Paris. 
The reason why I decided to interview him was because of his extensive knowledge of the 
issue, given that he has worked for the BCEAO, has been minister of economic prospective 
and public policy evaluation in Togo, and has always been a very active actor in discussions 
revolving around the CFA franc, through numerous books and articles he has published, in 
addition to television and radio broadcasts he took part in. 
 
The reason why the CFA franc has been chosen for answering the present research 
question is because it is the last and only colonial currency still in use today (Nubukpo et al. 
                                                          
1 The CFA franc is in fact divided between two zones: the west CFA franc and the east CFA franc. The west CFA 
franc is used in the UEMOA, and includes the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Ivory 
Coast, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The east CFA franc is used in the CEMAC, and includes the following 
countries: Cameroon, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon. 
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2016, p167). Its uniqueness offers the rare opportunity to study the underlying power relations 
between a former colonial power and its former colonies in a context where an element of 
economic extraction – the CFA franc – has remained and is still fully controlled by France. As 
will be explained, it acts as an extractive, trans-national economic institution. The trans-
national nature of it come from the fact that it is France who controls it, and more specifically 
the French treasury, who is the sole decision-maker of its rules and regulations, such as its 
exchange rate and several modalities pertaining to the volume and use of foreign exchange 
reserves that member countries must place within the French treasury vaults. Although most 
qualitative studies use an inductive approach, emphasizing the preference for treating theory 
as something that emerges from the collection and analysis of data, some qualitative 
researchers argue that qualitative data can and should have an important role in relation to the 
testing as well the use of theory to explain a case (Bryman 2012, p.387). 
The first step will be to present A&R’s theory of inclusive and extractive institutions, by 
explaining the processes by which the nature of political institutions conditions that of 
economic institutions, how interrelated they are, and what effects do inclusive and extractive 
institutions have on market access. The role of rent extraction, as well as the different ways in 
which extractive institutions hamper economic growth will be presented. In the second step, I 
use the aforementioned theoretical framework to provide an explanation for the CFA franc, by 
testing the theory in practice in order to determine if, and to what extent, the CFA system 
constitutes an extractive economic institution. If the CFA fulfils the criteria characterizing 
extractive institutions as described by A&R – which are presented in chapter four – and if 
there has been little or no sustained economic growth over time, then A&R’s theory will be 
confirmed. If the former does not fulfil those criteria and or there has been sustained 
economic growth over time, then A&R’s theory will be falsified for the presence case. If the 
case fits the theory, then it follows that, in line with my hypothesis which is presented in the 
next section, the CFA system acts as a neocolonial tool, perpetrating the domination over 
Africa that France established during the colonial era. 
It must be emphasized however that A&R’s framework normally applies to national 
economies, and does not intend to capture power relations between states, in a trans-national 
extractive setting. If the theory holds and the hypothesis is confirmed, I infer that A&R’s 
analytical framework can be extrapolated to international economic and political institutions, 
following the same mechanisms. The latter process corresponds to the last step of deductive 
reasoning described by Bryman in which induction is used by the researcher to infer his or her 
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findings for the theory that prompted the whole exercise. The findings are then fed back into 
the stock of theory and the research findings associated with a certain domain of enquiry (Ibid 
p.24). 
 
 
1.4 Hypothesis 
 
Starting from a chronological and sequential approach to the problem, the following 
hypothesis is established: 
 
The CFA system finds its origins in a formally extractive setting, as colonialism is by 
definition extractive. In line with A&R’s theory, an extractive economic and monetary 
institution has been established in order to accommodate France’s needs and desires. By the 
economic rent – although small – and the political leverage France derives from the system, 
the CFA is by consequence trans-national, for it involves processes, transfers and power 
relations across countries. As the system still exists today – and has not changed much since 
1945 – several questions arise. Following A&R’s idea that economic and political institutions 
are mutually reinforcing, a corollary emerges: 
 
For the system to have survived, it appears that some elements of France’s colonial 
behavior must have lived on, translating into an external extractive political institution. France 
appears to keep exerting a certain political pressure on the CFA countries, by acting as, and 
maintaining an extractive institution. As such, it follows that colonialism has taken a new 
form, neocolonialism, for which the CFA franc is a tool, and an expression of it. 
 
The hypothesis hinges upon the assumption that the CFA franc is indeed extractive, which 
will be argued in chapter five. 
 
 
 
1.5 Limitations 
 
1.5.1 Data collection 
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As an interview has been conducted, it is worth considering the possible biases that might 
have impacted the validity and reliability of the data collected. As previously said, I 
interviewed Kako Nubukpo, director of the IOF. As I interviewed him he seemed hesitant 
about certain questions, for instance when I asked him about the amount of money France 
derives from the interests perceived on the operations account of the CFA zone. To the latter, 
he repeatedly stated that France does not perceive anything, although other sources, including 
a book he co-wrote (“Sortir l’Afrique de la servitude monétaire. À qui profite le franc CFA?”) 
say otherwise. The fact that I recorded him could explain his reluctance to be honest, coupled 
with his high position within an organization representing France, its cultural values and 
language. 
 
1.5.2 Theoretical framework and generalizability 
The case study of the CFA franc will allow to us to gain in depth understanding of how power 
relations between states affect the construction and nature of transnational economic 
institutions. However, due to its uniqueness, the case of the CFA might not be generalizable 
to other settings, firstly because it is the last remaining colonial currency. Using Guba and 
Lincoln’s nomenclature, which relies on different criteria of reliability and validity than those 
used for quantitative methods, it could be said that there is a transferability issue, which refers 
to the degree to which findings can be generalized across social settings (Guba and Lincoln in 
Bryman, 2012, p.390). Nonetheless, because qualitative research typically entails the 
intensive study of a small group, that is, depth rather than the breadth that is a preoccupation 
in quantitative research, qualitative findings tend to be oriented to the contextual uniqueness 
and significance of the aspect of the social world being studied. Considering this, the analysis 
of the present case provides valuable insights about institutional reproduction from colonial 
eras to post-colonial ones, while also shedding light on the new forms transnational power 
relations have embraced. 
 Moreover, as previously explained, A&R’s framework normally applies at the 
national, not the international level. I am therefore extrapolating a theory to an unusual 
context, which I expect not only to pose no major issue, but from which I intend to expand the 
scope of the theory hereby used.  
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2. Functioning of the CFA franc 
 
 
The present section contains a non-exhaustive list of the main regulations and principles of 
the CFA franc.  
 
The CFA franc zone is based on four key principles:  
 
● The unlimited convertibility of the CFA franc in euro (in French franc before the creation of 
the euro) guaranteed by the French treasury. 
 
● The exchange rate between the CFA franc and the euro is fixed, and has only been changed 
once since the creation of the currency, in 1994. 
 
● In order to guarantee the fixed exchange rate, the foreign exchange reserves of the CFA 
countries are centralized in their respective central banks, of which 50% are required to be 
deposited in a current account managed by the French Treasury, called the “operations 
account”. 
● The free movement of financial flows and capital between the franc zone and France (and 
with the entire European union since the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht). 
 
An inflation target is also imposed upon the CFA countries: the UEMOA – the West 
African area of the CFA franc – has a 2 % inflation target while the CEMAC – the Central 
zone – has a 3% limit on inflation. Moreover, France imposes a 20% minimum rate of 
coverage of the monetary base in order to guarantee the peg. This rate of coverage 
corresponds to the amount of sight liabilities – in the form of foreign exchange reserves – that 
a central bank holds in relation to its monetary base (Gulde, 2008, p.7). As will be explained 
in detail in another section, this significantly limits the access to credit for economic agents, 
thereby hindering economic growth and development.  
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3.Literature review 
 
This section provides a review of the most prominent literature on power relations between 
states as well as critical theories of development.  
 
 
3.1 Power politics 
 
In order to untangle the power relations underpinning the CFA system, we can make use of 
Susan Strange’s views on power.   
Susan Strange recognizes two forms of power: relational and structural power. 
Relational power is the conventional "power of A to get B to do something they would not 
otherwise do", relying on instruments of overt coercion and or bribery (Strange, 1988, p.24). 
Structural power, by contrast, is "the power to shape and determine the structures of the 
global political economy [...] the power to decide how things will be done, the power to shape 
frameworks within which [actors] relate to each other" (Strange, 1988, p.24-25). In other 
words, structural power is the power to set the agenda that defined the choice set available to 
others. Four key structures are identified: security, production, finance, and knowledge. Of 
most direct relevance here of course is the financial structure: "the sum of all the 
arrangements governing the availability of credit plus all factors determining the terms on 
which currencies are exchanged for each other" (Strange, 1988, p.90). This analysis provides 
key insights for the present study, for France – as will be explained – controls both the 
availability of credit and the exchange rate of the CFA franc, indicating that France exerts 
significant control over the African countries belonging to the franc zone, thereby de facto 
perpetrating its domination over its former colonies. Similarly, Strange argued that the 
creation and control of credit was a significant source of power in the global economy 
(O’Brien & Williams 2013, p12).  
Interestingly, she argued that control can be exercised indirectly rather than directly. In 
Strange’s words: “the possessor [of structural power] is able to change the range of choices 
open to others without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to 
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make one choice rather than others (Strange 1988, p.31). Such power is less "visible". The 
CFA system illustrates perfectly the aforementioned aspect of power politics. By using a 
transnational monetary and financial system as an intermediary, France renders less visible its 
agenda, by blurring the line between the gains it derives from it and that of the African 
member states.  
 
3.2 Dependency theory 
 
Dependency theory can offer a helpful approach to analyze the case of the CFA in relation to 
the present research question. Dependency refers to the asymmetrical economic relations 
between metropolitan societies and non-European peripheries – a factor resulting in the 
development of the former at the expense of the underdevelopment of the latter (McMichael 
2011, p.6). In the words of Andre Gunder Frank, – leading author of the dependency 
paradigm – “[…] underdevelopment is in large part the historical product of past and 
continuing economic and other relations between the satellite underdeveloped and the now-
developed metropolitan countries. When we examine this metropolis-satellite structure, we 
find that each of the satellites [...] serves as an instrument to suck capital or economic surplus 
out of its own satellites and to channel part of this surplus to the world metropolis of which all 
are satellites (Frank in McMichael 2011, p.7). The CFA can be analyzed in the same manner, 
as its member states centralize the foreign exchange reserves derived from the export of 
primary commodities, to then invest them in the operations account created for them by the 
French treasury. Looking at the situation from a dependency perspective would lead to the 
conclusion that France – the core – extracts economic surplus from its former colonies, which 
are at the periphery of the world system. The CFA countries’ underdevelopment is thus a 
reflection of the manner of their incorporation into the global capitalist system. 
Dependency analysts also focus on how “northern states” are able to use the financial system 
to retain great influence in developing countries’ economies (O’Brien 2013, p.157). The CFA 
system provides a good illustration of this process, as will be argued in the present study. 
 
 
 In order to unveil the power relations between France and the CFA countries, the 
present study relies upon A&R’s theory of institutions. Important to notice is that Acemoglu 
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and Robinson are mainstream economists, whose core theories are built upon neoclassical 
economics (Smith 2013). However, the theories and authors presented in this literature review 
would be classified as belonging to critical IPE or critical economic theory, which stands in 
opposition to mainstream theories of development (O’Brien 2013, p.159). The bulk of 
evidence for power relations between states indeed comes from critical IPE. Nonetheless, I 
will demonstrate that they all lead to the same conclusion in the present case, as A&R’s 
theory offers an explanation for the dominant position that France holds in relation to its 
former colonies. In other words, it is possible to use mainstream political economy to make 
the same claims as critical IPE – namely that France continues to exert power over its former 
colonies, under the guise of neocolonialism. 
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4.Theoretical framework: Acemoglu and 
Robinson 
 
In “Why Nations Fail”, A&R intend to explain the variations in cross-national economic 
development by focusing on national level institutional factors. In the present study, I adapt 
their theoretical framework to analyze trans-national processes of institution-building and 
institutional reproduction.  
 
4.1 The different types of political and economic 
institutions 
A&R distinguish four types of institutions: inclusive political institutions, inclusive economic 
institutions, extractive political institutions and extractive economic institutions. 
 
4.1.1 Inclusive institutions 
According to A&R, two elements make a political institution inclusive: the degree of 
centralization and the degree of pluralism. Political institutions determine who has power in 
society and to what end that power can be used. If that power is sufficiently distributed across 
society and subject to constraints, then that institution can be said to be pluralistic. 
Centralization on the other hand determines the ability of the state to enforce the rule of law, 
to support economic activity and to provide security for its citizens (A&R. 2012, p.94). 
Without such political or state centralization, the state cannot fulfil its most basic role, and the 
society it governs is doomed to “descend into chaos” as A&R have said. As a consequence, 
we refer to political institutions that are sufficiently centralized and pluralistic as inclusive 
political institutions. 
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Following A&R, “inclusive economic institutions […] are those that allow and encourage 
participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make the best use of their 
talents and skills” (A&R. 2012, p. 144). To be qualified as inclusive, economic institutions 
must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public 
services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract. As 
such, inclusive economic institutions depend as much on the notion of plurality as their 
political counterparts. In addition, they must also permit the entry of new businesses and 
allow people to choose their careers (Ibid p.89). Inclusive economic institutions create 
inclusive markets, which not only give people freedom to pursue the vocations in life that best 
suit their talents but also provide a level playing field that gives them the opportunity to do so. 
 
 
4.1.2 Extractive institutions 
Extractive political institutions can be defined as institutions where power is narrow, 
unconstrained, and concentrated in the hands of a few. Such institutions are exemplified by 
the absolutist monarchies reigning throughout the world during much of history, or, for a 
contemporary example, North Korea’s dictatorship. In line with the aforementioned definition 
of inclusive political institutions, if one or both of the two criteria is missing – pluralism and 
centralization of power – then the institution can be qualified as extractive.  
 
Extractive economic institutions have the opposite properties to those we call 
inclusive; they are designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to 
benefit a different subset. By preventing certain individuals to enter certain markets, or to 
exercise certain professions, or by simply forcing them to enroll in unpaid labor such as 
slavery, extractive economic institutions put an obstacle to the free functioning of markets. 
Similarly, a state incapable of, or unwilling to enforce property rights and contracts between 
private parties, and prevent fraud and theft constitutes an extractive system, for it prevents its 
citizens to produce, exchange and take part in the economy in an optimal manner. Given the 
central role public goods and services play in an economy, if the state fail to provide public 
infrastructures such as roads and a transport network, its economic institutions do not fulfil 
the requirements to be classified as inclusive, and are as such, at least partially extractive. In 
A&R’s words, extractive institutions block the engines of prosperity, or make them work in 
reverse (Ibid p.102). 
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4.2 How do political institutions influence economic 
institutions? 
There is a strong synergy between political and economic institutions, as the nature of one 
influences that of the other. More specifically, A&R suggest that there is a causality from 
political to economic institutions, meaning that it is the nature of the political institution that 
will in turn determine the nature of the economic institution of a given country. Political 
leaders can shape the economic system at their convenience in an extractive political system, 
given that they hold a disproportionate amount of power. As such, they will build economic 
institutions that allow them to extract economic surplus from the rest of society, as the 
absence of democratic oversight over their actions does not restrain their ability to do so. In 
that sense, while inclusive institutions are generally good for the prosperity of a nation as a 
whole, some people or groups are better off by implementing extractive institutions. 
Extractive economic institutions thus naturally accompany extractive political 
institutions (Ibid p.95). In fact, they inherently depend on extractive political institutions for 
their survival, because inclusive political institutions – vesting power broadly – would tend to 
uproot economic institutions that expropriate the resources of the many, erect entry barriers, 
and suppress the functioning of markets so that only a few benefit. Furthermore, due to the 
synergetic relation between extractive political and economic institutions, a strong feedback 
loop reinforces this mechanism. Indeed, extractive political institutions enable the elites to 
choose economic institutions with few opposing forces and constraints, while also enabling 
them to structure future political institutions and their evolution (Ibid p.96). Extractive 
economic institutions, in turn, enrich the same elites, and their economic wealth and power 
help consolidate their political dominance. The dynamics underpinning the nature of political 
and economic institutions are thus pro-cyclical and self-reinforcing. 
Moreover, even if new actors succeed in breaking through and achieve power under an 
extractive political institution, they are likewise subject to only a few constraints since the 
structure of that institution remains unchanged. As a result, they have incentives to maintain 
these political institutions and create a similar set of economic institutions. 
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4.3 How do extractive institutions limit access to 
markets? 
 
The type of economic institutions that a nation is subject to have a direct impact on the ease 
with which people can access markets. The present section seeks to explain the mechanisms 
by which inclusive and extractive institutions modulate a people’s ability to access markets. 
 
Under inclusive economic institutions, people are free to choose their profession, whether 
to start a business or not, whether to invest or not, in addition to having the confidence that 
their property rights are guaranteed. One could thus say that freedom is the cornerstone of 
inclusive economic institutions. Inclusive economic institutions create inclusive markets, 
which not only give people freedom to pursue the vocations in life that best suit their talents 
but also provide a level playing field that gives them the opportunity to do so. Those who 
have good ideas will be able to start businesses, workers will tend to go to activities where 
their productivity is greater, and less efficient firms can be replaced by more efficient ones 
(A&R. 2012, p.91). 
In contrast, extractive economic institutions are characterized by the systematic exclusion 
of certain individuals or groups from markets, while transforming certain markets into 
“exclusive preserves”, for the benefits of the elites. Slavery provides a good example of an 
extractive economic institution. Slaves are deprived of their ability to choose their profession 
and whether they want to enter certain markets; they are instead coerced to take part in a 
productive activity.  
Education occupies a central role in A&R’s concept of extractive institutions. Indeed, the 
latter fail to provide adequate education to the people – because of inexistent or insufficient 
public services – which leaves no choice for most citizens but to work as poor, uneducated 
farmers. As those institutions fail to provide enough skills and education to their citizens, the 
latter are limited in their choice when entering the labor market, or are completely excluded 
from the latter and instead partake in other forms of work such as slavery or serfdom. 
Monopolies enforced by the government, also called legal monopolies, constitute another 
form of exclusion from the market that is characteristic of extractive institutions. 18th century 
Europe provides a clear illustration of this, as aristocrats derived most of their income from 
landholdings and trading privileges granted by the state. The inability for most people to enter 
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those markets translates into exclusive markets. Likewise, the impossibility for slaves to own 
land in European colonies in the Americas is an example of restricted market. 
 
 
4.4 The role of rent extraction 
 
A central feature of extractive economic institutions is their ability to allow one or several 
economic agents to extract a rent from the rest of society. According to A. Smith, a rent is an 
unearned income or profit reaped by those who did not sow (Smith in Kaldor, 2007). Another 
definition of rent is given by Lucian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, who define the term as "[an] 
extra returns that firms or individuals obtain due to their positional advantages” (Bebchuk et 
al. 2004, p.62).  
Under extractive political institutions, political leaders can implement policies to 
expand their own wealth and that of their relatives, following a clientelism logic. Examples of 
economic rent include import tariffs, subsidies to certain sectors, or the imposition of 
regulations on competitors in order to increase one’s market share. Corruption of public-
sector employees can also involve an extraction of rent, such as tax officials who would take 
bribes for lessening the tax burden of certain tax payers. While rent-seeking behaviors do 
exist in inclusive institutional settings, they remain marginal compared to extractive ones. The 
reason for the iniquitousness of rent extraction in extractive institutional settings is the high 
concentration of power, and the lack of checks and balances on that power. If a narrow elite 
possess all the political power and rule over a sufficiently centralized nation, it has the ability 
to request favors and accept bribes in exchange for protection and legal recognition over one’s 
activity or business.  
 In contrast, under inclusive political institutions, rent-seeking behavior is prohibited 
and fought against due to the ability of citizens to use their political power to do so. Indeed, 
economic rents are by definition unearned, and are extracted from the economy by economic 
agents who did not contribute to their creation, which make them undesirable. Supposing that 
those rents are sufficiently visible so that most people have identified them, people will use 
their legal rights to request the abolition of such rent extractions. 
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 Furthermore, as inclusive economic institutions create and sustain inclusive markets, 
rents are not viable under them, due to the existence of competition. If an individual or group 
of individuals extract a rent from a certain activity, by setting a price exceeding the market 
price, other suppliers will take over his market share by setting a lower price. The free entry 
and exit of markets puts an obstacle to any rent-seeking activity. 
 
 
4.5 The impact of extractive institutions on economic 
growth and development 
 
The ultimate objective of A&R’s analysis of institutions is to provide an explanation for the 
determinant of long-term economic growth, and by the same token, to explain the divergence 
of growth across countries over the course of history. The central thesis of “Why Nations 
Fail” is that economic growth and prosperity are associated with inclusive economic and 
political institutions, while extractive institutions typically lead to stagnation and poverty. The 
present section explains the mechanisms underpinning the aforementioned processes. 
 
4.5.1 Allocation of resources 
Inclusive economic institutions offer the most favorable conditions for economic development 
for several reasons. Under such institutions, people are free to choose their profession, 
workers will tend to go to activities where their productivity is greater, and those who have 
good ideas will be able to start businesses. Secure private property rights – which are a feature 
of inclusive institutions – are central to economic success, since only those with such rights 
will be willing to invest and increase productivity. Furthermore, public goods such as road are 
associated with greater exchanges and better allocation of resources, all of which are key to 
economic growth. 
 In contrast, extractive institutions cannot sustain economic growth for extended 
periods of time because of their inability to secure property rights and to foster trade and 
innovation. They are designed to maximize wealth for the elites, but not for a broad cross-
section of society.  
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4.5.2 Technological change 
 
In line with the neoclassic growth theory, technological change is the main driver of economic 
growth (Todaro & Smith 2015, p.138-139). In the long-run, adding more capital and labor is 
ultimately less important than learning new technologies that increase productivity per person 
and per unit of capital. Consequently, given that technological change results from innovation, 
it follows that an economic system conducive to innovation is also conducive to economic 
growth. 
According to A&R, extractive institutions frustrate the process of creative destruction 
resulting from technological change by two channels: the lack of economic incentives and 
resistance from the elites (A&R. 2012, p.144). The first is due to the fact that in the absence 
of secure property rights, investing is a risky game. If the economic reward from an 
investment is jeopardized by theft or plagiarism, a cost-benefit analysis will indicate that such 
an investment is not worth it. The second comes from the tendency for political elites in 
extractive systems to resist changes that reallocate incomes away from themselves and 
towards new companies and individuals (Ibid, p105). Indeed, innovation and its resulting 
economic growth creates both winners and losers, by a process named creative destruction 
(Schumpeter in Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012, p.98). The former replaces old production 
processes with new ones, and new sectors divert resources from old ones. Inclusive political 
institutions are better able to cope with these frequent and difficult transitions than extractive 
political institutions, as there is a net gain for society overall and only a minority of the 
population bears the costs. As political power is broadly spread, and most people are better off 
or at least not worst off, creative destruction is less often and less intensively fought against 
under inclusive institutions. 
Therefore, growth moves forward only if not blocked by the economic losers who 
anticipate that their economic privileges will be lost and by the political losers who fear that 
their political power will be eroded. It is precisely the latter process which prevails under 
extractive institutions, due to the extensive political and economic power held by the elites, 
enabling them to resist technological change. 
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5.Analysis 
 
5.1 From colonialism to neocolonialism: how an 
extractive political institution led to an extractive 
economic and monetary system 
 
5.1.1 The genesis of the CFA 
 
The CFA franc was instituted in 1945 during the colonial rule of France over its African 
territories. In line with A&R’s hypothesis that extractive political institutions lead to 
economic institutions of the same nature, the direction of the causality was indeed from 
political to economic institutions, as the former where put in place in the late 1880s 
(Shillington 2005, p.301).  
Prior to 1929, the FF was the only legal tender in all French colonies, after what the 
metropole decided to relegate monetary emission for its Sub-Saharan territories to the BAO, a 
private, French owned bank (Nubukpo et al. 2016, p.86). That was the first step towards the 
institution of a monetary zone under the aegis of the metropole. The creation of the CFA franc 
– separated from but pegged to the FF – was the cornerstone of France’s strategy to build the 
“Colonial pact”, an integrated commercial zone where its colonies would not have to worry 
about industrial competitiveness as their exclusive role would be to produce primary 
commodities, while the metropole would transform the latter in its industries, or export them 
without transformation in order to raise foreign exchange reserves (Ibid). 
After having taken power in its colonized territories, France installed extractive 
political institutions – or took control of them in case they already existed – to gain full 
control over the populations. These institutions were indeed extractive according to A&R’s 
definition, as power was narrow, unconstrained, and concentrated in the hands of a few 
(Nubukpo et al. 2016, p.177). The CFA system was an apparatus through which France could 
further expand its grip over its overseas territories in a logic of full control of the chain of 
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production. The intended consequence was to create a “chasse gardée”, an exclusive market 
where only French industrial products could enter without having to compete with other 
countries’ products. Still in line with A&R, the political elites – both French and African –, 
facing no democratic oversight over their actions, could in total impunity set the economic 
institutions favoring their own interests. 
 
 
5.1.2 A system of political repression at the service of France’s 
interests 
 
Despite the independence of its former African colonies, France still wields a high degree of 
influence in sub-Saharan Africa. The present section aims at analyzing this influence, that 
lead some observers to qualify France as a neocolonial power. 
For Kwame Nkrumah, neocolonialism is a process through which a theoretically 
independent state, having all the “outward strappings of international sovereignty”, has an 
economic system and a “political policy” direct from outside (Nkrumah 1965). In addition to 
the economic rent it derives from the operations account – which will be discussed later on –  
France has a significant political leverage over the CFA nations. France has favored the ruling 
of “unique presidents” as a tool to maintain the economic order of the CFA franc, using 
different political manipulations (Kako et al. 2016, p177). This model of neocolonial control 
relies on the longevity of the executive power, and contains two essential modalities: 
presidency for life and dynasty. Almost all the African political leaders who opposed the CFA 
franc were either assassinated or toppled (Sylla in Nubukpo et al. 2016, p.176). Between 1960 
and 2012, the CFA zone has been the scene of 78 attempted coups, 37 of which having led to 
a change of government. The most notorious example of coup organized by France is the 
assassination of the then president of Togo, Sylvanus Olympio, in January 1963, in line with 
France’s strategy of elimination of “anti-French” leaders (Ibid p.84; Nubukpo, 2017). 
Furthermore, from 1960 to 2005, France launched 46 military operations in its former African 
colonies (Griffin 2007). In fact, French military interventionism in the latter has been a 
relatively consistent policy since 1960, and is supported by an extensive network of bilateral 
Franco-African defense and military assistance treaties. The propensity of France to conduct 
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military interventions in its former colonies – members of the CFA zone – reflects its 
domination over what is nothing but a critical geopolitical area for the metropole. 
The despotic leaders ruling over the CFA countries are thus backed by France, which 
allows them to remain in power. On the other hand, France benefits from the political support 
these leaders give her, as they are aligned on France’s interests in all international decision-
making meetings, including those of the UN (Nubukpo 2017). The CFA franc plays a key role 
and even constitutes a sine qua non condition for this conditional support from metropolitan 
France. Political leaders therefore cannot emancipate from the guardianship offered by the 
CFA system, due to their lack of legitimacy, or else they would soon lose power. This 
voluntary servitude, in which political leaders accept to maintain an extractive trans-national 
economic institution, is thus an expression of this lack of political legitimacy.2 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2 Given the extractive nature of the CFA franc, and its inherent inimicality to economic growth 
and industrialization, one could wonder why, in the context of seemingly independent sovereign 
countries, would any nation maintain such an inadequate monetary system. For that matter, 
Gramsci’s thought can bring interesting explanations, by shedding light on the institutional and 
political mechanisms underlying this system, and by unveiling the motives of the relevant 
stakeholder.  
For Gramsci, power is a necessary combination of consent and coercion (Gill 1993, p.52). 
This duality is clearly displayed in the dynamics underpinning the CFA franc system. On one 
hand, however coercive and violent the French authorities might have been when they introduced 
the franc, the monetary system could not possibly have survived without the consent of the 
African elites of these countries. As previously explained, this local elite has a lot to gain from the 
maintenance of the CFA, hence their consent to collaborate. On the other hand, coercion has been 
extensively used throughout the countries that use the CFA franc over time, in order to maintain 
the power that France exercises on its (former) colonies.  
Moreover, Gramsci argues that coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, 
deviant cases (Gill, 1993, p.53). History confirms that argument: as illustrated by the sporadic 
interventions of France in Africa to punish deviant behaviors and actors, coercion is a last resort 
measure used by France to put back in place the elements constituting its hegemony and 
domination over its former colonies. France therefore exerts power over the franc countries 
through a mix of coercion and consent.   
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5.2 How the CFA franc limits access to markets: credit 
rationing 
 
The present section explains how the CFA limits access to financial markets through a 
financial repression. 
 
According to Kako Nubukpo, the economies of the franc zone are characterized by an 
endogenous credit rationing, the latter being the consequence of the hidden agenda of the two 
central banks, the BCEAO and the BEAC. In order to understand the problem, we need to 
explain the functioning of the operations account. 
 
As explained in chapter two, one of the key rule of the franc zone is that all of the member 
countries have to deposit at least 50% of their net external assets – also called foreign 
exchange reserves – into the operations account managed by the French treasury (BEAC 
2007). The member states first centralize their foreign exchange reserves with their respective 
central bank – the BCEAO for the UEMOA countries and the BEAC for the CEMAC 
countries – and these two central banks are expected to transfer at least 50% of those external 
assets to the operations account (Nubukpo, 2016, p.107). All member countries have to keep 
at the minimum a 20% external coverage rate, meaning that for every franc their central bank 
issue, they need to have 0.2 franc denominated in foreign currencies. In other words, the 50% 
of their foreign exchange reserves which must be put in the operations account have to cover 
at least 20% of the monetary base – the money circulating in the franc zone (Banque de 
France1 2015). These requirements are a condition that member states must respect if France 
is to maintain the fixed exchange rate and guarantee free convertibility into euro. However, 
the effective external coverage rate is significantly larger than what is required by France. On 
the 31st of December 2014, it stood at 84.3% for the UEMOA and 89.8% for the CEMAC, 
corresponding respectively to 7,033.6 and 8,387.47 billion CFA francs, or a total of 23.51 
billion euros (Banque de France2 2015). The reason why the two central banks hoard so much 
liquidities is because their staff and the political leaders of those countries earn interest on 
them, which as will be explained in the next section, translates into a rent extraction. 
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 External Coverage Rate 
(In billions of CFA franc ; Rate in %) 
 
 
Figure 1 displays the external coverage rate and the volume of foreign exchange reserves 
held by the BCEAO under the operations account controlled by the French treasury. In any 
given year, the coverage rate exceeds the required 20% by a large margin.  
 
Figure 1: External coverage rate in UEMOA 
    
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Net External Assets     
of the BCEAO (1) 6 955,6 7 051,2 6 574,0 7 033,6 
Sight Liabilities of the      
 BCEAO (2) 6 473,3 6 685,9 7 297,9 8 339,2 
External Coverage Rate of 
  
    
  Monetary Emission (1)/(2) 107,5 105,5 90,1 84,3 
 
 
 
The direct consequences of the excessive reserves deposited within the French treasury 
are the high interest rates stemming from the rigorous fiscal management characterizing the 
two regional central banks and the little leeway for conducting monetary policy, also caused 
by rigorous fiscal management. To maximize the volume of liquidities it holds, the UEMOA 
has implemented a credit control system named “monetary programme” which allocates each 
year a fixed and predetermined credit volume to each member country. This system persists 
today, and continues to assign a precise volume of liquidities to each country through the 
national banking system (Nubukpo 2016, p.127). As a consequence, credit is expensive. In 
2013 in the UEMOA, the average interest rate on personal loans excluding tax and charges 
was 7.56% (Banque de France 2013), and the bank account penetration rate – the proportion 
of adults having a bank account – stood at 12.6% in 2015 (Banque de France2 2015). In 
comparison, France and Morocco displayed a 3.8% and 6.3% average interest rate on personal 
loans respectively. After including tax and charges, the interest rate that a household or 
business needs to pay is around 10-15% (BCEAO 2014). A report from the Banque of France 
states that “overall, financial inclusion and the development of the financial system remains 
weak”. The franc zone only has three bank machines per 100,000 inhabitants (Banque de 
France2 2015). 
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The zone’s small degree of financializaton is also reflected by the small ratio of credit to 
GDP, which stood at 23% in 2014, as opposed to 155% in South Africa, over 100% in the 
E.U and 300% in the USA (Pigeau, 2016). This financial repression is all the more puzzling 
knowing the presence of massive liquidities held by the French treasury through the 
operations account. This endogenous credit rationing – which is the direct consequence of the 
CFA system – constitutes an exclusion from access to markets for most people, caused by 
prohibitively high interest rates. 
 
 
 
5.3 The CFA franc and rent extraction 
 
There are two levels at which a rent is extracted from the African countries part of the franc 
zone. First, through the operations account, which as we will see, incentivizes the two 
regional central banks to extract liquidities from commercial banks, by imposing restrictive 
fiscal rules upon them. Those liquidities are then invested in the operations account, which 
earns interests for the staff of the two central banks and the ruling class of those countries. 
Second, by its exchange rate level and regime, which has strong distributional effects.  
 
5.3.1 The operations account: rent seeking disguised under a financial 
stabilization commitment 
As already mentioned, the purpose of the operations account is to maintain the peg with the 
euro and to guarantee the full convertibility of the franc into the euro. However, its design 
incentivizes rent-seeking behaviors leading to large amounts of excessive liquidities which, 
instead of financing local productive investments in a logic of endogenous growth, are 
allocated to investments in France or elsewhere. These massive stocks of foreign exchange 
reserves held by the French treasury under the operations account earn interests for France 
and for the BCEAO and BEAC, amounting to 1.25% –  the ECB marginal lending rate – for 
the deposits below the mandatory threshold and 0.75% – the minimum main refinancing 
operations rate – for the assets exceeding the minimum threshold (Trésor Direction Générale, 
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2013). Although France’s direct material gain in the centralization of foreign exchange in the 
operations account is relatively small, it is important to notice is that France pays 0.5% of its 
public debts with this system (Nubukpo, 2016, p.110). African leaders on the other hand, 
including but not limited to the central bankers of the BCEAO and BEAC, collect the 
remaining wealth generated by those interests as indicated by article 11 of the UEMOA 
preamble (UEMOA 1973). A rent is therefore extracted from the economies of the CFA franc 
members through the excessive hoarding of foreign currencies from their central banks – way 
beyond what is required to maintain the parity with the euro – which as we explained in the 
previous section, negatively impacts credits, but also the conduct of monetary policy.3  
It should be stressed, however, that France does not impose the current external coverage 
rate that the CFA countries display. Indeed, as previously explained, France only requires a 
20% external coverage rate as a condition for the unlimited convertibility (Banque de France1 
2015). The system is thus only extractive to the extent that the collaboration and consent of a 
certain African elites – which Nubukpo calls “voluntary servitude” – is a condition sine qua 
non for the extractive nature – and more basically, for the very existence – of this monetary 
and financial system. 
 
5.3.2 The distributional effects of the CFA 
The second way in which an economic rent is captured is more insidious and indirect than in 
the first case, and comes from two causes: the exchange rate and the exchange regime.  
The first cause has to do with the chronic overvaluation of the CFA franc, which has 
continuously undermined the competitiveness of the zone. Several studies have found the 
CFA franc to be overvalued, by an estimated 10% as of 2014 (Gulde et al, 2008, p.9). The 
former simply acts as an export tax, because it makes products more expensive when sold in 
foreign currencies, and by the same token, as an import subsidy, as it makes foreign products 
cheaper (Pigeau 2016). As farmers derive all their revenues from the sell – mostly exports – 
of agricultural products, and as the share of imported goods in their total consumption in very 
low in comparison to the middle and upper urban classes, they bear most of the costs 
associated with the strong value of the currency. The rich urban classes on the other hand can 
                                                          
3 In Andre Gunder Frank’s words, we could say that there is extraction of economic surplus from the 
(neo)colonies – the periphery in Frank’s terminology – to Metropolitan France – the core (McMichael 2011, 
p.7). 
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buy imported goods, including sophisticated manufactured goods which typically are not 
produced locally, at a cheaper price. 
To comprehend the distributional effects of the second cause, the exchange regime, the 
Mundell-Fleming model needs to be exposed. The latter demonstrates that states cannot 
simultaneously maintain free movement of capital, have an independent monetary policy, and 
fixed exchange rates – either fixed or with gradual movement. This is also known as the 
Triffin dilemma, and it states that only two of those objectives can pursued, but the third 
could not be sustained for an extended period of time because it would violate the other two 
(O’Brien et al, 2013, p.158). If a government favors capital mobility – with the aim of 
attracting foreign investment – and choses to opt for fixed exchange rates, then it cannot use 
monetary policy for purposes of demand management or balance-of-payments adjustment by 
influencing aggregate demand. Indeed, the interest rates set by the central bank must then be 
equal to the “international interested rate”, or else capital movement will jeopardize the peg – 
capital flight in case of domestic interest rates being inferior to the international interest rate 
and capital inflow in the other case (Burda et al, 2013, p.247). This poses a tradeoff between 
two competing values: stability and flexibility. Achieving monetary stability can be a 
substantial benefit for countries that have endured high and highly variable inflation and other 
domestic monetary disturbances. But since achieving this stability means forgoing monetary 
flexibility, this can be a substantial cost for countries that face severe external shocks to which 
monetary policy might be the appropriate response (Broz 2001).  
The CFA zone, by having a fully fixed exchange rate system, enjoy a certain stability, 
but it belongs to the latter category, as it chronically suffers from strong external shocks 
(Hallet 2008). The reason why the exchange rate regime has distributional effects is because it 
is the poor, rural population who fully endogenizes the opportunity cost of full stability – 
namely the absence of flexibility – which translates into squeezed revenues whenever an 
exogenous negative shock – such as deteriorating terms of trade – occurs. The fixed exchange 
rate indeed makes it impossible to devalue the currency to maintain competitiveness when 
such a shock occurs, which means that the only solution to return to equilibrium is to apply a 
downward pressure on wages. African primary commodity producers thus pay the cost of the 
adjustment through a cut on their revenue. The well-off urban classes on the other hand, who 
are the main consumers of imported goods, benefit from the fixed exchange rate because it 
entails a stability of prices. Furthermore, the fact that there is unlimited convertibility into 
euros and free capital movement – at the cost of credit rationing and inflexible monetary 
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policy, which as we saw mainly impact the poorest segments of the population – means that 
the political and economic elite is free to capitalize their money into high-yield, safe 
investments abroad, with the guarantee of a fixed exchange rate. If they decide to make local 
investments instead, the low legal limit on inflation, again combined with the fixed exchange 
rate, also guarantees a certain return on investment. Obviously poor people do not benefit 
from this, as they do not have the ability to save, as reflected by their almost total average 
propensity to consume. 
Between 1986 and 1994, the CFA countries experienced a series of dramatic economic 
crises during which the zone saw no economic growth, when other Sub-Saharan African 
countries were growing at 2.5% annually (Clément, 1996). Because of the overvaluations and 
rigidly high wages, economic performance started to deteriorate, and adjustment had to come 
through reduced employment and output. In fact, for some of the countries, there was an 
output contraction comparable to the Great Depression in the United States, with disastrous 
social consequences. Cameroon experienced a 41.5% decline in per capita output during the 
period, compared to 30.9% “only” in the US during the 1929 Great Depression (Shatz & Tarr 
2000). The incidence of poverty doubled in Côte d'Ivoire from 30% to 60% between 1985 and 
1992 (Ibid). 
The system is therefore extractive to the extent that the vast majority of the population of 
the CFA countries work in the production of primary commodities (Dembele 2011) whose 
export yield foreign currencies which are extracted by the banking system and invested within 
the French treasury, but only an insignificant part of the African population – the political 
elites, which act as a rentier elite – benefit from it, as almost none of this economic surplus is 
reinjected in the local economy. The misaligned exchange rate allows the elites to import 
more of the goods and services they desire – boosted by an overvalued currency – at the cost 
of a share of the rest of the population’s nominal revenue, which is indirectly extracted by the 
former. Finally, the vast majority of those countries’ population – mostly rural population – 
pay the costs of the monetary and financial repression, characterized by expensive credits, 
almost inexistent public goods and services, and magnified exogenous shocks, due to the 
rigidity of the exchange rate regime. 
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5.4 How does the CFA system hamper economic 
growth? 
 
“Nations fail today because their extractive institutions do not create the incentives to save, 
invest and innovate”  
- Acemoglu & Robinson 2012, p.413. 
 
After having shed light on the functioning of the operations account and explained briefly its 
impact on credit, it becomes obvious that if the two central banks were to stop hoarding so 
much liquidities, by only maintaining a 20% external coverage rate for instance, or if they 
were to abandon the CFA franc altogether, the system would suddenly become much less 
extractive. Indeed, this volume of money could be either lent to the governments of those 
countries at a low interest rate, directly invested in development projects such as building 
schools and hospitals, or passed on to the private sector through loans by alleviating the 
restrictions on credit. It is all the more surprising that the CFA countries recurrently borrow 
money on international financial markets at an average interest rate comprised between 5.5% 
and 6.5% in order to finance their fiscal deficits (Pigeaud 2016 ; Banque de France2 2015). 
The independence of the two regional central banks and the legal framework characterizing 
the CFA system prevents the former from lending to the respective government of their zones 
(BEAC 2007), thereby enhancing the extractive nature of the CFA system. All the 
aforementioned alternatives would in the long run lead to sustained economic growth, by 
increasing endogenous consumption and investment, and by fostering innovation which, 
according to Acemoglu, is the key reason why extractive institutions fails to generate 
economic growth (A&R 2012, p.94). Indeed, in line with neoclassical models of economic 
growth, technological change – which is induced by innovation – is the main driver of 
economic growth, because diminishing returns to factors of production implies that at a 
certain point, only increases in productivity – which arise from technological change – can 
lead to intensive growth by offsetting the effects of diminishing returns (Todaro & Smith 
2015, p.138-139). Acemoglu argues that two factors prevent extractive institutions from 
generating sustained technological change: lack of economic incentives and resistance from 
the elites. Those two obstacles are clear in the present case.  
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Given the high interest rates that economic agents face, and given that an investment is only 
undertaken if its returns exceed the interest rates paid to finance it, it is no surprise that there 
are little economic incentives to invest and produce within the CFA zone for the local 
population. Little investments entail little capital accumulation, which is a necessary condition 
for production, but it also reduces the rate of technological change, which is an essential 
component of sustained economic growth (Ibid p.142). 
 The data confirms that economic growth has been sluggish in the franc zone. 
According to a UN report, the CFA countries have displayed lower growth rates from 1960 to 
2012 compared to non-CFA African countries (Amin 2000). According to the same source, 
the most important factor hampering long-term growth has been the institutional rigidity 
imposed by the monetary and exchange rate arrangements stemming from the CFA system. 
From 1965 to 1980, the yearly average growth rate was 4.2% in CFA countries as opposed to 
6.3% in non-CFA African countries (CIA 1994). During 1986-92, there was negative growth 
per capita in all CFA countries (-2.8%) which was not experienced by non-CFA African 
countries. During the same period, the export growth rate stood at -4.8% per annum, 
indicating a decline in the volume of exports (Amin 2000). For the period 1960-2014, four 
countries have had negative growth rate per capita (Comores, CAR, Niger and Senegal), and 
six have had below-one percent per capita growth (Benin, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea-
Bissau, Tchad and Togo). Most strikingly, Côte d’Ivoire’s 2014 GDP per capita is 41% lower 
than in 1970 (World Bank 2017).  
The weak economic performance of the CFA countries translates into low levels of 
development and well-being. In 1999, the latter scored lower than the average of the other 
African countries in terms of HPI (UNDP 1997). Furthermore, all of the UEMOA nations 
rank in the “low human development” part of the HDI, and four of them (Guinea-Bissau, 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) rank among the five lowest in the index (UN 2006). The CEMAC 
countries perform only marginally better, with Chad and CAR in the bottom seven and the 
rest in “middle human development” (Ibid). 
In conclusion, the main channel through which the CFA franc hampers economic 
development is credit. Credit is too expensive for any economy to grow, especially emerging 
economies such as the CFA countries which, according to a recent UN estimate, would need 
an annual 7% growth rate in order to halve the number of poor people (Nubukpo, 2016, 
p.130). Expensive credits lead to few investments, therefore less innovation, less growth, and 
in fine, less development. 
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Conclusion 
 
While conserving Acemoglu’s elements characterizing extractive institutions, and conserving 
the final outcome – namely the absence of sustained economic growth over the long run – the 
present analysis offers an original use of Acemoglu’s theory of institutions. I have shown that 
the CFA franc indeed acts an extractive economic and monetary institution as described by 
A&R, as it excludes certain people from markets, enables a rentier elite to extract a rent from 
the rest of the population, and hampers economic growth and development. Following the 
idea that the nature of political institutions conditions that of economic institutions, the CFA 
finds its origins in an extractive political setting, namely the French colonial rule of Africa. 
Due to its extractive nature, this system could prevent the emergence of inclusive political 
institutions, as it gives more power to the established elites who have the incentives to do 
everything they can to maintain their privileges. This translates into extractive political 
institutions – characterized by a lack of plurality – and is indeed reflected by the 
predominance of presidency for life and dynasty as methods of ruling in the franc zone. Paul 
Biya, who has been in power in Cameroon since 1982, and the Bongo family, who have been 
ruling Gabon since 1967, are respective examples of the two main methods of ruling 
(Nubukpo et al. 2016, p.177).  
Moreover, I have proven in chapter five that France maintains strong extractive ties 
with its former colonies, and that strong power imbalances prevail between the two. First, 
through the functioning of the operations account, which extracts liquidities from the member 
countries, allowing France to pay part of its public debts while also enabling her to invest 
those liquidities into higher yield investments. Second, through the political manipulations 
France has committed, including coups and assassinations, which made it possible to put in 
power political leaders backed by France, thereby favoring the metropole’s interests. France 
therefore continues to exert a certain political pressure on the CFA countries, by acting as, and 
maintaining an extractive economic and political institution, with the help of the CFA franc. 
As such, I conclude that colonialism has indeed taken a new form, neocolonialism, for which 
the CFA franc is a tool, perpetrating de facto France’s domination over its former colonies. 
By its impact on credit and subsequently on economic growth, neocolonialism – through new 
mechanisms and processes – is indeed similar in essence to colonialism and similarly 
jeopardizes economic development and national sovereignty. The hypothesis is therefore very 
plausible. 
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Given that the theory holds for the present case, and that the hypothesis is deemed 
plausible, I infer that A&R’s analytical framework can be extrapolated to international 
economic and political institutions, following the same mechanisms. Provided that the CFA 
franc case is generalizable, power relations between states affect the construction of trans-
national economic institutions by building trans-national extractive institutions whenever a 
power imbalance subsists, such as between a colonial power and its colonies. Such extractive 
institutions are designed to benefit the dominant country, while also benefiting the ruling class 
of the dominant country or countries, in line with Nubukpo’s concept of “voluntary 
servitude”. Furthermore, in the same way extractive political institutions lead to economic 
institutions of the same nature at the national level, strong interdependency between political 
and economic institutions appears to exist at the trans-national level. Extractive trans-national 
political institutions – such as colonialism, as it involves capturing political power from a 
country and outsourcing it –  enhance the extractive aspect of the local economic institutions, 
and adapt the latter in order to transfer the economic rents captured to the home country, 
thereby creating a trans-national pattern of economic surplus extraction. Although the 
findings might not be generalizable, the present study suggests that institutional reproduction 
dynamics are embedded within international power relations. Further research in this field is 
needed to produce a comprehensive analysis of the mechanisms by which power relations 
between state affect the construction of trans-national economic institutions. 
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